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TEACHING AN OLD DOG OLD TRICKS:
COPPAGE V KANSAS AND AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT REVISITED
Kenneth M. Casebeer*
How much is that doggie in the window?
I do hope that doggie's for sale.
Curiously, almost seventy years after the decision, commentaries
on Coppage v. Kansas' are reappearing in the legal literature.2 As
recent generations of law students will recall, in striking down Kan-
sas' criminal prohibition against conditioning employment on an em-
ployee's refusal to join or remain a union member,3 the infamous
Copyright@ 1985 by Kenneth M. Casebeer.
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; A.B., 1971, Georgetown Univer-
sity, J.D., 1974, Harvard University Law School. This Article is part of a larger work in
progress, The Legal Structure of the Workforce, focusing on the structural interdependence of
common law and statutory doctrines governing the nonunion worker. Appreciation is ex-
pressed to David Trubek, Patrick Gudridge, Robert Rosen, and Jeremy Paul for criticism of
the ideas of this Article, and to Howard Lesnick, who stimulated a new interest in Coppage, see
infra note 2.
This work was partially supported by a grant from the University of Miami School of
Law.
1 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
2 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 8-4, at 440 (1978); Epstein, A Common Law
for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357 (1983);
Lesnick, Book Review, 32 Buffalo L. Rev. 833, 843-45 (1983) (reviewing J. Atleson, Values
and Assumptions in American Labor Law (1983)).
3 Following the Coppage decision such employment conditions, colloquially known as
"yellow dog" contracts, were much discussed. See, e.g., Carey & Oliphant, The Present Status
of the Hitchman Case, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 441 (1929); Cochrane, Attacking the "Yellow Dog"
in Labor Contracts, 15 Am. Lab. Legis. Rev. 151 (1925); Cochrane, Labor's Campaign
Against "Yellow Dog" Contracts Makes Notable Gains, 17 Am. Lab. Legis. Rev. 142 (1927);
Cochrane, Why Organized Labor is Fighting "Yellow Dog" Contracts, 15 Am. Lab. Legis.
Rev. 227 (1925); Hale, Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, 15 Am.
Lab. Legis. Rev. 155 (1925); Witte, "Yellow Dog" Contracts, 6 Wis. L. Rev. 21 (1930); Com-
ment, The Yellow Dog Contract, 15 Marq. L. Rev. 110 (1931).
Cochrane quotes Ohio labor leader John P. Frey's statement that the yellow dog contract
has caused "'more feeling, more bitterness in the hearts of wage-earners than any other condi-
tion which has been established by those who have enjoyed the right of organization and who
use that power to devise ways and means which have denied the same right to the mass of the
people.'" Cochrane, Attacking the "Yellow Dog" in Labor Contracts, supra, at 151 (1925).
Organized labor's opposition was less to conditioning employment of an irreplaceable (in
the short term) labor supply for individual companies on nonmembership (which conditioning
was largely unenforceable), than to the later availability of injunctions against unions based on
their allegedly tortious interference with contracts in attempts to organize employees of yellow
dog companies. This private right to injunctive relief was upheld in Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
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Coppage decision now appears to be the quintessential artifact of reac-
tionary due process limitations on public police powers-an artifact
since rejected by a newer, progressive constitutional jurisprudence.4
Yet, as if a Coppage would have to be constructed were it not
already conveniently available, it is almost always misread and stud-
ied for the wrong or for peripheral reasons. The true Coppage opinion
devotes very little text to defining the limits of public authority or the
role of the state in regulating private conduct. Instead, the Court as-
sumed that its conclusion seemed to automatically follow from a
proper description of the public power's role to reinforce and extend
the primacy of private, consensual conduct:' Coppage for the most
part simply describes the Court's image of the "necessary" social or-
ganization of the labor market in civil society.6
4 See G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 453-58 (1lth ed. 1985); L. Tribe, supra note 2, at
440. Other candidates for quintessence would include Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), and Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
5 Few judges state in their opinions the image constitutive of their argument as directly as
Justice Pitney. The social phenomenon constructed in legal decisions as the exercise of state
power usually must be described by the deconstruction of form, styles, models, and rationaliza-
tions of the opinion as a text. In the most eloquently direct statement of the role of legal
consciousness in social discourse, Karl Klare writes:
Legal discourse shapes our beliefs about the experiences and capacities of the
human species, our conceptions of justice, freedom and fulfillment, and our visions
of the future. It informs our beliefs about how people learn about and treat them-
selves and others, how we come to hold values, and how we might construct the
institutions through which we govern ourselves. In these respects legal discourse
resembles all other forms of systematized symbolic interaction. The peculiarity of
legal discourse is that it tends to constrain the political imagination and to induce
belief that our evolving social arrangements and institutions are just and rational,
or at least inevitable, and therefore legitimate. The modus operandi of law as legit-
imating ideology is to make the historically contingent appear necessary. The
function of legal discourse in our culture is to deny us access to new modes of
conceiving of democratic self-governance, of our capacity for and the experience of
freedom. Legal discourse inhibits the perception that we have it in our power to
alter and abolish existing patterns of domination and denial of human potential. It
is, in short, the vocation of legal thought to render radical, nonliberal visions of
freedom literally inconceivable.
Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1358, 1358 (1982)
(citation omitted).
6 "Civil society" refers to Hegel's conception of the realm of life in which the subject
thinks of herself (holds the consciousness) as a universal participant. This realm corresponds
roughly to the bourgeois economy, as opposed to the realm of state politics in which the citizen
takes on a specific and interest-laden identity. It is, however, as a universalized actor that the
subject recognizes the atomized needs of self and others that generate the division of labor and
give rise to class conflict. G. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, 182-208 (T. Knox trans. 1st
ed. 1965); see also J. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, 320-22 (1958) (presents elemental
systems of Hegelian "civil society" that culminate in distinct social classes accomplishing divi-
sion of labor through which the individual can achieve "substantiality," and the integration of
a public aspect to individual life); C. Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, 109-11 (1979) (dis-
cusses Hegel's "civil society" concept with respect to the unavoidable differentiation of roles in
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This Article will first reconstruct the Coppage Court's reasoning
in order to refocus attention on the judicial images of the employment
relation which structured and determined that reasoning and the
case's outcome. It will then trace Coppage's continued vitality: the
Coppage image of the organization of the labor market continues to
influence both common law doctrines and statutory interpretation
governing employment, even though the case is anathema within our
ordinary constitutional jurisprudence.7 In conclusion, this Article ex-
plores the familiar critical insight that the public/private8 distinction
in constitutional law fails to distinguish regimes of legal power or to
define institutionally based rights and duties. More importantly, this
Article suggests that the survival of the Coppage image indicates that
the public/private distinction functions partly as a decoy. By serving
as too transparent a straw figure, the distinction only feebly masks
judges' manipulation of public power. Full of false confidence, those
who tilt at the distinction's deployment in constitutional law decon-
struct the image in an increasingly stylized critique while failing to
notice sufficiently the unchecked progress of the Coppage Court's pro-
gram in the so-called private law regime.
modem society and misplacement of the aspiration to absolute freedom given the concurrent
differences in manner in which each modern estate can and wants to relate to the whole). But
see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Bradley, J.) (relying upon an understanding that
some market activities by their public nature are the subject of potential regulation and others
are constitutionally insulated as private); W. Blackstone, Commentaries (arguing throughout
that civil society is a realm of private life as opposed to conduct partly constituted and regu-
lated by law); K. Marx, On The Jewish Question, Karl Marx: Early Writings 211-42 (R. Liv-
ingstone, trans. 1975) (critique of Hegel arguing that the realm of the universal citizen is the
realm of state politics in which the subject attempts to emancipate herself from the interests of
particular wants and needs in order to gain control over self-identity, but also in which, under
bourgeouis capitalism, the state reinforces an artificial market organization constituting civil
society). See generally, The State and Civil Society, Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy (Z.
Pelczynski, ed. 1984) (series of essays that focus on the distinction between state and civil
society fundamental to Hegelian political philosophy). This Article asserts that by the time of
Coppage the Supreme Court had emphasized the Hegelian concept as a matter of assumed
legal consciousness. The Article's critique of this phenomenon means to hold onto the Hege-
lian emphasis on structures of consciousness associated with the historical development of
political societies-particularly in the critique's description of legal doctrine-while using
Marx's critique of the state legitimizing the constructed character of all discourse and social
organization.
7 See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (overruling Coppage so far
as inconsistent with National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1935), on ground
that Congress' power "to deny an employer the freedom to discriminate in discharge," id. at
187, extends to limiting discrimination in hiring); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act on ground that commerce power ex-
tends to promotion of industrial peace by protecting employees' right to organize for redress of
grievances and for promulgation of agreements with employers).
8 1 am using the term "public/private" as shorthand for the relation between the state and
civil society.
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Critics frequently and correctly demonstrate that the now-dis-
carded substantive due process of laissez faire judges has simply been
deflected into new, less rigid and therefore less coherent forms.9 The
public/private distinction ideology, in the form of doctrines control-
ling court access' ° and substantive rights,'" still serves to an extent to
insulate the law's allocation of bargainable entitlements from realloca-
tion via public regulation or taxation.' 2 Resting upon this triumph,
they fail to recover the private by which the public is knowable and
known.' 3  The defining questions for legal consciousness concern
neither the privatization of public power nor the publicization of pri-
vate relations in any straightforward way,' 4 but rather the social
meaning contributed by legal articulation of background images of
natural social relations organizing the private/public unity, first as
they appear in the images of Coppage privacy, and then through the
images of the public welfare state.
I. THE YELLOW DOG'S BARK: THE EMPLOYMENT IMAGE
At issue in Coppage was a Kansas statute that made it a crime for
employers to "coerce, require, demand or influence any person or per-
sons to enter into any agreement. . . not to join or become or remain
a member of any labor organization or association, as a condition of
such person or persons securing employment, or continuing in ...
employment."' 5 The Coppage Court invalidated the statute on the
9 See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 205,
209-21 (1979); A Symposium: The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1289
(1982).
10 Such doctrines concern, for example, state action requirements, see Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), and standing, see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
11 For example, enforcement of substantive rights is bounded by purpose and intent inquir-
ies in equal protection jurisprudence. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-71 (1977). The ideology also tightly circumscribes due
process. See Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
12 See generally Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step by Way of the
Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. Miami L. Rev. 379 (1983) (examining
the public/private distinction as developed in the opinions of Justice Rehnquist).
13 I mean here to connote a Hegelian dialectical identity that denies both the public/pri-
vate distinction and a stylized deconstruction of it, and that therefore denies the constructive
rationality of the opposed relationship of even indeterminate terms like public and private. See
C. Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society 135-69 (1979).
14 See Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New Federalism: How the Burger Court's Polit-
ical Imagery Legitimizes the Privatization of Everyday Life, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 263
(1984); Comment, Cases that Shock the Conscience: Reflections on Criticism of the Burger
Court, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 713 (1980).
1s 236 U.S. at 6-7 (quoting Act of Mar. 13, 1903, Ch. 222, 1903 Kan. Sess. Laws 378).
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theory that it interfered with the liberty of contract protected by four-
teenth amendment due process.' 6
The West Publishing Company headnotes pronounce that the
case set doctrinal limits on the scope of state legislative regulation of
private activities pursuant to police powers.' 7 Not surprisingly, the
case is studied as a key to the content of the legal relationship between
the citizen in civil society and the limited state.18 Coppage is made to
stand for three propositions which define the classic public/private
distinction: (1) personal liberty and property must be pursued within
limits that preserve like liberty for all persons; (2) state police powers
derive from a legislative obligation to protect such formally equal lib-
erty and therefore must have internal legal limits reflecting their lim-
ited purpose; and (3) it is perverse to suppose that a common power
aimed at minimally necessary interference with property acquisition
could include power to directly redistribute private gains in the name
of public good. It follows that interference with liberty of contract is
definitionally prohibited by a system of individual rights that are en-
forced by courts as external embodiments of the principle of limited
grants of public authority. The courts' role as the keeper of this sepa-
ration of law and politics is authoritative interpretation of public
power.
While there is a good deal of such talk in Coppage,'9 these as-
sumptions do not reflect or, more importantly, credit the Court's em-
phasis on the factual context it described, and therefore they do not
satisfactorily explain the images which structure its argument. The
popular or headnoted version of Coppage seems to be about public
order, the organization of universalized politics in which, from the
legal standpoint, private liberty is what we leave ourselves as abstract
citizens after conceding power to the state to prevent the chaos of
unlimited competition. This view of Coppage is convenient as a straw
decision against which to justify a more enlightened and accurate
16 Id. at 26.
17 Headnotes to Coppage are found at 35 S. Ct. 240 (1915), and are keyed to the following
West subject heading and key numbers:
Constitutional Law (§ 275)-Due Process of Law-Liberty to Contract
Constitutional Law (§ 81)-Police Power
Master and Servant (§ I 1)--Police Power-Relation of Statute to Declared
Purpose
Constitutional Law (§ 82)-Police Power-Public Welfare
Constitutional Law (§ 275)-Due Process of Law-Liberty-Forbidding Discrim-
ination Against Union Labor.
1s See, e.g., G. Gunther, supra note 4, at 455-56; L. Tribe, supra note 2, at 440; Epstein,
supra note 2, at 1365-67.
19 See 236 U.S. at 13-19.
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view of public good post-1937 or to critique the lack of actual reform
in modem constitutional law, but it is impossible to square this view
with the use of precedent in Coppage20 or the basis of the opinion's
logic. Coppage is more about how public order reflects, rather than
regulates, the needs of "natural" private interests. "Public/private" is
not so much a dichotomy as a unity. Coppage makes the public sim-
ply the extension of its image of the private.
Strikingly, for three-quarters of the majority opinion Justice
Pitney described a complex image of the employment relation that
constitutes liberty of contract.2' This image is "natural" in the sense
of being unproblematic: consciously held as a starting point of analy-
sis, but not felt to require justification beyond definition as such. This
"natural" image structures the concept of the labor market, and, as a
corollary, organizes the articulation of deviations from the norm of
employment relations produced by external interventions such as leg-
islation. This image, then, allowed the police power's limits to be ig-
nored as a focus of reasoning: there is no need to assess issues such as
the contribution of the Kansas statute to the general welfare or ab-
stract questions of public goods traded against personal utility. The
point is never whether the public power includes regulation of private
behavior. The issue is always first phrased: "Does the natural relation
of employment include employers imposing conditions on offers of
employment?" If so, public power could not have been granted to
destroy the fabric of privately organized civil society.22
20 Cf. The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 491-96 (1908) (Congress' commerce
clause power extends to the regulation of master-servant relations so long as such regulation is
confined to interstate commerce because the master-servant relationship is one of the private
relationships upon which individual state relationships to their own citizens are derived and
diversely constituted and limited).
21 Justice Pitney ended this extended image with the statement: "So much for the reason of
the matter." 236 U.S. at 21.
Future Justice Louis Brandeis was not charitable in appraising the Coppage majority's
effort: "The Supreme Court of the United States which, by many decisions had made possible
in other fields the harmonizing of legal rights with contemporary conceptions of social justice,
showed by its recent decision in the Coppage case the potency of mental prepossessions."
Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 Nw. U.L. Rev. 461, 467 (1916) (citation omitted).
Later, future Justice Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene voiced a similar, if more mod-
erated, view:
Certainly, if a legislature, having due regard to the actual practice of industrial hire
and fire and, specifically, to the inequitable provisions of these contracts, should
conclude that a wise public policy does not justify their judicial enforcement, the
Supreme Court ought not to neglect the truth of such industrial facts, even if this
may involve a reexamination of some assumptions in the Coppage opinion.
Frankfurter & Greene, Labor Injunctions and Federal Legislation, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 766, 781
(1929).
22 Justice Pitney adopted Justice Harlan's words:
"[I]t is not within the functions of government-at least in the absence of contract
770 [Vol. 6:765
1985] OLD TRICKS 771
More specifically, the unity of the private/public relationship in
Coppage depends upon four interdependent premises which together
encode in legal discourse the natural employment relation in the form
of at-will employment:2"
between the parties-to compel any person in the course of his business and
against his will to accept or retain the personal services of another, or to compel
any person, against his will, to perform personal services for another."
Coppage, 236 U.S. at 10 (quoting Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (Harlan,
J.)). Again, contemporary response is informative:
The Coppage case recently decided by the Supreme Court illustrates perfectly the
present legal conception of labor, and of its relation to capital and to business, and
it would be difficult to find a case showing greater confusion in the law or one
showing more clearly that this confusion is due solely to the inability to recognize
the public nature of labor and capital.
Adler, Labor, Capital, and Business at Common Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 269 (1916) (foot-
note omitted).
23 In 1877 an obscure treatise writer, H.G. Wood, virtually invented the so-called Ameri-
can rule for construction of employment contracts for an indefinite period:
The one must be bound to employ, and the other to serve, for a certain definite
time, or either is at liberty to put an end to the relation at any time, and there is no
contract of hiring and service obligatory beyond the will of either party. A mere
promise to work for another, no time or terms being fixed, is not a contract for
service . . . . In order to make it binding, there must be mutuality, that is, the
one must be bound to serve and the other to pay.
H.G. Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant 157-58 (1877 & photo. reprint
1981).
Ostensibly, this doctrine serves the rational principle of employing public power to en-
courage mutually beneficial transactions by requiring all enforceable terms to be express.
However, for Wood such a principle still admits that some enforceable terms may be implied if
so tied to the circumstances and course of dealing between the parties as to be unnecessary of
statement. Wood further acknowledges that all contracts of hiring are mixed contracts, "be-
cause annexed to them all. . . there are certain implied conditions, a breach of which operates
as disastrously to the parties as a breach of the express provisions." Id. at 156. However, the
indefiniteness of a durational or discharge term apparently cannot be relieved by implying a
condition without interfering with the assumption that contract enforcement by the state en-
sures mutuality of private performance benefits. Interfering with at-will termination would
run counter to natural, but unstated, obligations of master and servant. Even so, the limits
those obligations impose on an employer's and employee's legitimate expectations of each
other in some small ways and at very high cost emancipate the servant, who cannot be tied to
an employer other than by express promises.
However, mutuality at its strongest also prevents an employee from enforcing a perma-
nent employment contract or a "contract for life" as more than an indefinite term or at-will
contract unless separate and adequate consideration was given for the permanent term. See
infra note 29. In a 1932 case, still cited and the basis of the majority rule, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana explained:
The reason for the distinction is obvious. An employee is never presumed to en-
gage his services permanently, thereby cutting himself off from all chances of im-
proving his condition; indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be against public
policy and the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handicap himself;
and the law will presume almost juris et de jure that he did not so intend. And if
the contract of employment be not binding on the employee for the whole term of
such employment, then it cannot be binding upon the employer; there would be
lack of "mutuality."
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1. Mobility. Relations of exchange maximize property accumu-
lation when appropriately free of restraints on the mobility of labor
and capital.
2. Mutuality. Legally enforceable restraint depends upon mutu-
ality of contract obligations.
3. Social Welfare. The private/public relationship is derived
from a consumption-oriented division of labor.
4. Equity. There is natural equity in legal enforcement of volun-
tary contracts.24
The starting point of the analysis in Coppage is what the parties
freely did and must naturally have done in their social relations with
each other: they engaged in a contract.
There is neither finding nor evidence that the contract of employ-
ment was other than a general or indefinite hiring, such as is pre-
sumed to be terminable at the will of either party. The evidence
shows that it would have been to the advantage of Hedges, from a
pecuniary point of view and otherwise, to have been permitted to
retain his membership in the union, and at the same time to remain
in the employ of the railway company. . . . But, aside from this
matter of pecuniary interest, there is nothing to show that Hedges
was subjected to the least pressure or influence, or that he was not
a free agent, in all respects competent, and at liberty to choose
what was best from the standpoint of his own interests.23
Thus, the state may prevent contract by coercion as a theft of capi-
Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932). For an
excellent but more materialist view of the origins of the American discharge rule, arguing that
the doctrine developed as an instrumental response to employers' wish to control middle man-
agers, agents, and similar technical employees as firm size and specialization increased with
industrial development, see Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20
Am. J. Legal Hist. 118 (1976).
24 In examining the phenomenological content of the Coppage opinion, no assertion is
made that Justice Pitney intended, either in an instrumental or teleological way, to cause labor
markets to be structured around these political and economic premises through the legal forms
of contract relations. Rather, Justice Pitney speaks descriptively precisely because the repro-
duction of social activity includes the rationalization of experience as a discourse of appear-
ances and understanding. Social activities are shaped by the ongoing process of such meaning-
attribution, as they in turn shape the possibilities of such description. Justice Pitney manifests
a consciousness of work not only present in but dominant to his time. Therefore, decoding his
natural image of employment need not depend upon finding the premises in a logical model
explicit in the opinion. Rather, it depends upon demonstrating that such a rationality appears
in the consciousness of the relation of the state to the labor market, that consciousness being
necessary to a coherent legal description of work, and making superfluous any policy argument
to justify the decision's outcome. See generally Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Con-
sciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563, 1564 n.2 (1984)
(describing phenomenology as the study of unreflective intended meanings as they appear or
are revealed to the consciousness).
25 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 8-9.
[Vol. 6:765
OLD TRICKS
tal-either the employer's resources or the employee's labor power-
but it may not prevent the disadvantages that may be necessary con-
cessions to reach a free exchange of capital in an employment
contract.26
Protection and prosperity meet in a civil society that is consti-
tuted by individuals' maximization of the accumulated gains of their
labor. The Court took the first premise encoding the image of the
natural employment relation-mobility of capital, including labor-
from Adair v. United States,2 7 the earlier, fifth amendment version of
the yellow dog contract prohibition:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems
proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of
labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such
labor from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the em-
ployE to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is
the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dis-
pense with the services of such employ6.2"
Because labor time is a form of capital, preserving its mobility
demands circumscribing contract interpretation to express limits on
other uses of the contracted capital. This leads to the second premise
of the image-mutuality of obligation: "Granted the equal freedom of
both parties to the contract of employment, has not each party the
right to stipulate upon what terms only he will consent to the incep-
tion, or to the continuance, of that relationship?"29
Assuming the Coppage image, then, the public interest lies in
26 But, on this record, we have nothing to do with any question of actual or
implied coercion or duress, such as might overcome the will of the employi by
means unlawful without the act. In the case before us, the state court treated the
term "coerce" as applying to the mere insistence by the employer, or its agent,
upon its right to prescribe terms upon which alone it would consent to a continu-
ance of the relationship of employer and employE.
Id. at 8.
27 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
28 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 10-11 (quoting Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75).
29 Id. at 12.
Indeed, mutuality of obligation develops a more surgically precise application than this
entitlement to conditions precedent. The stronger requirement is that of mutuality of consid-
eration for specific conditions or promises. This stronger application is, of course, antithetical
to the Second Restatement of Contracts familiar to first year law students, see, e.g., Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts § 79 (1981) ("Adequacy of Consideration; Mutuality of Obliga-
tion. If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of (a) a
gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, disadvantage, or detriment to the prom-
isee; or (b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or (c) 'mutuality of obligation.' "). However,
it is good work law. See supra note 23 (discussion of the construction of permanent employ-
ment terms); see also Murphree v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d 1218 (Ala.
1984) (a contract of permanent employment is not enforceable unless employee supplies valua-
ble consideration independent of the services to be performed). On the general narrowing of
1985]
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maintaining the division of labor in the economic organization of so-
cial relations based upon mutual exchange. Producer-employers con-
sume labor time in order to exchange the resulting products for
purchasing power; laborer-employees produce labor time in exchange
for purchasing power for themselves. The aggregated set of such ex-
changes defines a division that is consumption oriented. The social
state that is made up of the aggregate of things and services depends
solely on the products elicited for exchange in satisfaction of con-
sumer wants; it does not depend on the character or substantive ends
or inherent value of what is actually produced. 3° According to the
image, the employer must be free to deploy capital both in investment
in an enterprise and within the enterprise itself to maximize return as
she personally judges best. Only employers can decide what condi-
tions maximize productivity at minimum cost; neither employees who
want a greater return for their labor nor judges are in a position to
the scope of "black letter" contract law, see L. Friedman, Contract Law in America 20-24
(1965).
Yet even the stronger doctrine of mutuality of consideration exhibits the limited
emancipatory potential of legal discourse as an arena. Cf. E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters
258-69 (1975) (because law is an institution that has independent characteristics, history, and
logic of evolution, it not only mediates, reinforces, and ideologically legitimates existent class
relations, but also its forms and procedures may inhibit arbitrary excesses of power, somewhat
protecting the powerless, and cannot accomplish the former without the latter, and so allow
law to be an arena for social conflicts). The aspect of yellow dog contract doctrine most hated
by the unions-the right to injunctive relief against unions for tortious interference with con-
tract created by Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917)--was rendered
impotent in New York by a series of decisions distinguishing the employers' Coppage right to
impose conditions of nonmembership in a union upon continued at-will employment from the
judicial unenforceability of such conditions-for lack of consideration- against employees as
agents for the union. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N.Y. 65, 159 N.E. 863
(1928); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927); Inter-
borough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, 131 Misc. 682, 227 N.Y.S. 258 (1928). As Edwin E.
Witte stated:
These contracts were artfully drawn, obligating on their face the employer as well
as the employes. Upon proof that the employer's promises did not afford the em-
ployes any real protection, and opinions from many of the leading students of
labor problems of the country condemning yellow dog contracts as anti-social, the
court found that no valid contract existed; and that, hence, no action lay against
the unions for seeking to persuade employes to join them. Because they do not
expressly dissent from the Hitchman case, it can be argued that these New York
decisions still leave open the possibility that contracts may hereafter be drawn
which will meet the tests of mutuality and consideration. As concerns the present
forms of such "contracts," however, it seems to be settled in New York that they
are to be regarded merely as a condition of employment, which the employer may
lawfully insist upon but cannot enforce by any legal process.
Witte, supra note 3, at 26.
30 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, 118-26 (1958).
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second guess the value of the closed shop.3 For the optimal organiza-
tion of the consumption-oriented division of labor, investment deci-
sions must be legally insulated from employment decisions because
the division of labor for production in service of social consumption
must be separated from the distribution of returns arising from the
production process.32
The third and fourth premises of the Coppage image possess a
complex interdependency: private interest is maximization of
purchasing power; public interest is maximization of aggregate
purchasing power; public interest therefore includes minimization of
costs of production, including labor costs. Strict enforcement of mu-
tual obligations of contract in service of mobile capital is, therefore,
neutral with regard to contracting parties because it enables both em-
ployees' and employers' capital to seek its highest-valued market use,
even if the result of such contract enforcement is inequality of
31 To this line of argument it is sufficient to say that it cannot be judicially declared
that membership in such an organization has no relation to a member's duty to his
employer; and therefore, if freedom of contract is to be preserved, the employer
must be left at liberty to decide for himself whether such membership by his em-
ploy6 is consistent with the satisfactory performance of the duties of the
employment.
Coppage, 236 U.S. at 19.
32 See Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603 (1905). In Berry a former employee
brought a tort action for malicious interference with his employment contract against a union
representative whose union's closed-shop contract required discharge of all nonunion, at-will
employees. The Adair-Coppage image was so strong that the court held that even though the
fired nonunion employee could not prevent his employer from exercising its right to discharge
him for any or no reason at all and an individual could offer to work the same job for lower
wages, thereby displacing existing employees, the closed-shop union counterpart to the Cop-
page yellow dog contract was nonetheless outside the contracting parties' rights to condition
exchange of their capital. The court distinguished mutuality of condition in the name of
preventing employment contract inroads into ownership control of investment:
In such a case the action taken by the combination is not in the regular course of
their business as employ~s, either in the service in which they are engaged or in an
effort to obtain employment in other service. The result which they seek to obtain
cannot come directly from anything that they do within the regular line of their
business as workers competing in the labor market. It can only come from action
outside of the province of workingmen, intended directly to injure another, for the
purpose of compelling him to submit to their dictation.
. . . If such an object were treated as legitimate, and allowed to be pursued to
its complete accomplishment, every employi would be forced into membership in
a union, and the unions, by a combination of those in different trades and occupa-
tions, would have complete and absolute control of all the industries of the coun-
try. Employers would be forced to yield to all their demands or give up business.
Id. at 357-59, 74 N.E. at 605-06. For an approach to the Berry conundrum emphasizing a
more autonomously legal-reasoning explanation, see generally Kelman, American Labor Law
and Legal Formalism: How "Legal Logic" Shaped and Vitiated the Rights of American Work-
ers, 58 St. John's L. Rev. 1 (1983) (describing courts' use of legal formalism to develop a set of
"fundamental principles" through which the party holding the "superior" right always won).
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purchasing power.3
The principle is fundamental and vital. Included in the right of
personal liberty and the right of private property-partaking of the
nature of each-is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of
property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employ-
ment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money
or other forms of property. . . . The right is as essential to the
laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast
majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire
property, save by working for money.34
Public enforcement of such exchanges on their own terms is not tak-
ing sides: inequalities are natural and enforcement defines the public
good of all, it is therefore naturally equitable.
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must
and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens
that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally un-
hampered by circumstances. . . . [F]or the contract is made to
the very end that each may gain something that he needs or desires
more urgently than that which he proposes to give in exchange.
And, since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in com-
mon, some persons must have more property than others, it is from
the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and
the right of private property without at the same time recognizing
as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary
result of the exercise of those rights. But the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, in declaring that a state shall not "deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law," gives to each of
these an equal sanction; it recognizes "liberty" and "property" as
co-existent human rights . . .3
Because the public interest lies in maximizing the natural rela-
33 It might be objected that rather than minimizing costs of production, including labor
costs, the premises are better read as seeking efficient costs of labor as a factor of production.
This weaker formulation would take account of the assumption in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), that public interest includes a Keynesian intrusion into the free
market's return to labor in order to support short term aggregate demand for existing produc-
tion stocks and goods.
First, at the time the Coppage image was constructed, even justices sympathetic to labor
assumed the social interest in aggregate labor cost minimization. See Vegelahn v. Guntner,
167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Second, as Coppage
makes clear, it was within the employer's constitutional right to foolishly exploit his or her
labor supply in the short term, particularly in competition with other employers. Whether
good or bad macroeconomics, the commitment of legal consciousness held no place for an
efficiency divergent from cost-minimization. See also infra note 90 (discussing effect of the
market on at-will employment contracts).
34 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 14.
35 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
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tions of private exchange, the public power cannot redistribute private
wealth. Rather, public interest may operate only to prevent coercion
that interferes with the free mobility of capital to its highest person-
ally, presently valued use, or to provide resources for the benefit of all
that cannot efficiently be pursued privately.
The Act . . .is intended to deprive employers of a part of their
liberty of contract, to the corresponding advantage of the em-
ployed and the upbuilding of the labor organizations. But no at-
tempt is made, or could reasonably be made, to sustain the purpose
to strengthen these voluntary organizations, any more than other
voluntary associations of persons, as a legitimate object for the ex-
ercise of the police power. They are not public institutions,
charged by law with public or governmental duties, such as would
render the maintenance of their membership a matter of direct
concern to the general welfare.36
That economic leverage is not coercion, and that the public inter-
est does not extend to the personal consequences of leveraged con-
tracts is dictated by this natural image of the relations in civil society.
These relations are not typified by universal citizens voting for the
public good-a general welfare to which all contribute to receive
greater personal benefits than they could pursue personally, and
which thereby defines the limits of absolute personal liberty. The ba-
sic social relation which defines the civil society, to which limited
state interventions are necessary and which those interventions serve,
is the at-will employment contract. Such social organization implies a
private/public unity, not a public/private opposition between univer-
sal and self interest."
36 Id. at 16.
37 Professor Richard Epstein acknowledges the natural employment assumptions driving
the Pitney opinion: "The approach of Coppage has found modern philosophical support in R.
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)." Epstein, supra note 2, at 1366 n.29. Nozick's
libertarian social philosophy proceeds from an ontology of radical individualism to define a
moral and political norm of the minimum state whose just function is limited to prevention of
personal coercion and violence and is antithetical to redistributive regulations of individual
choice and conduct. Epstein celebrates this ideology by suggesting the utility and rightness of
the yellow dog contract, id. at 1370-75, 1382-85, apparently on the ground that if unions are
efficient organizers of wage contracts, they will render the yellow dog superfluous; if they are
not, mobile workers will get the maximum wage "deserved," as indicated by an unregulated
mutual exchange of employers and employees. This restatement of Coppage mutuality as-
sumes that there is no relevant relation between state power and the position of capital in civil
society.
While a detailed new examination of this assertion must await another forum, consider
Edward A. Adler's response to those natural employment assumptions, which was contempo-
rary with Justice Pitney's statement of Coppage ideology and apology:
That the members of the community have no interest in how profits from commu-
nity services shall be divided, no right to participate in the rendering of that ser-
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This image exhausts the reasoning of the majority. Curiously, it
vice, no control of the time, manner and conditions under which that service shall
be performed, are seen to be at best modern ideas. And when we take into consid-
eration the special legislation with which modern communities surround business,
the protective tariffs, the corporation laws with their guaranties of individual im-
munity from the consequences of failure or mismanagement, the bankruptcy laws
and receiverships by which the community wipes off at a stroke the results of par-
ticular business adversities and absorbs the loss by distributing it over the whole
range of industry, the inappositeness of such expressions as "his business," "his
capital," "interference with his business" becomes all the more apparent. "Capi-
talist" and "capitalism" also are but vague or figurative expressions, conveying no
definite idea and capable of as many connotations as there are persons to employ
them.
Adler, supra note 22, at 264-65 (footnote omitted). Another contemporary wrote:
There is no equality before the law, there never has been and it is difficult to con-
ceive how there could be.
The common law interferes with liberty by imposing legal duties and these
duties are not the same for all. One of these duties is the duty not to trespass on
another's property. We often hear it stated that property is an enlargement of
personal liberty; in a certain sense this is true; it is also clearly true that it is a
denial of the liberty of the non-owners. But every person is at the same time an
owner of some and a non-owner of other property. Hence the institution of owner-
ship constitutes for everyone both a curtailment of some sort of liberty and an
enlargement of some other sort of liberty.
• ..Consider the situation with respect to modern industrial property of
which the owner makes no personal use. In this case it is not the freedom to enter
the factory and find it unoccupied that matters to him. His ownership, with its
restrictions on the liberty of workers, consumers and others, enables him to derive
an income from the production that takes place in the plant. And that income
serves to release him from many of the interferences which other men's property
rights would otherwise impose on his liberty.
But the Justice did not note that the exercise of the right to contract was
interfered with by the owners when they insisted on the men leaving the job or
leaving the union. Whether this interference by the employer, with the help of the
law of property, or the interference attempted by statute, was the more "arbitrary"
interference is the question Justice Pitney failed to face.
No particular set of inequalities, therefore, can be said to be the necessary
result of the existence of private property and of (otherwise) free contract. It is
failure to recognize this fact which vitiates another statement of Justice Pitney,
when he said that, "since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in com-
mon, some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of
things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property
without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune
that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights." As there is no one set
of inequalities that must necessarily flow from property and contract, it cannot be
asserted dogmatically that a statutory rearrangement of the existing inequalities
will necessarily involve more restriction on liberty and more impairment of prop-
erty rights than the reverse. It may merely have the effect of weakening the liberty
and property of the more favored to strengthen the liberty and property of the less
favored.
1985] OLD TRICKS 779
did not exhaust the possibilities of public intervention indicated in
earlier liberty of contract/labor cases, notably Holden v. Hardy.38 Us-
ing Holden, both dissents in Coppage attempted different reconcilia-
tions of public power and private interest. Justice Holmes dissented
only briefly, citing his dissents in Lochner v. New York 39 and Adair,
4
0
and calling upon the Court to directly overrule those decisions.4' In a
more extensive dissent, Justice Day reasoned that it is the freedom to
contract or not to contract that is crucial to private ordering. There-
fore, he argued, so long as the at-will mobility of both labor and capi-
tal are preserved, the legislative removal of a term from, or imposition
of a condition on, a contract offer in the name of general welfare can
Hale, supra note 3, at 157-60 (footnote and emphasis omitted) (quoting Coppage, 236 U.S. at
17).
"Natural" images are constructed. Epstein cannot simultaneously reject the contempo-
rary legitimacy of public power under West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), in
a nostalgic lust for the dependency of public power on private "consent," and still insist on the
natural neutrality of bargains struck between the legal fictions of organized capital and the
publicly affected mobility of "owners" of labor-time commodities. He disingenuously mixes
static modeling and economic reality in rhetorically trumpeting: "If inequality of bargaining
power had any descriptive power as a model, then why did employers not use their power to
reduce wages to the vanishing point, or refuse to accept unionization before the passage of
either the Norris-LaGuardia or Wagner Acts?" Epstein, supra note 2, at 1372.
The answer is that once labor is simply a commodity, as Epstein explicitly assumes, the
partially state-constituted market will drive commodity prices down to the marginal cost of
reproduction of the resource, that cost of reproduction being the minimally acceptable family
wage necessary to supply laborers in the form of the labor commodity. This pressure will in
turn be resisted by workers and their families through economic, legal, and political responses
and within evolving cultural patterns. If Epstein is right in suggesting that the only normative
standards are Nozickian rights theories or act utilities, we are all trapped within a poverty of
imagination and thought.
38 169 U.S. 366 (1898). Holden upheld against a fourteenth amendment due process attack
a Utah statute that limited an employee's work day in mines, smelters, and refineries to eight
hours. The miners' self-interest in bargaining a suitable wage premium for risk to health was
not thought to preempt a public concern for safety and health.
The former [proprietors] naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible from
their employ~s, while the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to con-
form to regulations which their judgment, fairly exercised, would pronounce to be
detrimental to their health or strength. In other words, the proprietors lay down
the rules and the laborers are practically constrained to obey them. In such cases
self-interest is often an unsafe guide, and the legislature may properly interpose its
authority.
• . . But the fact that both parties are of full age and competent to contract
does not necessarily deprive the State of the power to interfere where the parties do
not stand upon an equality, or where the public health demands that one party to
the contract shall be protected against himself.
Id. at 397.
39 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40 208 U.S. 161, 190 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 27 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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be permitted.42 Thus, Justice Day in effect distinguished Adair and
invoked Holden to allow a term's removal where the removal acts on
public perception of undue economic pressure arising from an em-
ployee's lack of mobility43 to relinquish an otherwise legal entitlement
to join a union.
Both Justices Day and Holmes distinguished the legal articula-
tion of public power from the articulation of the consequences of Jus-
tice Pitney's natural employment image, but neither directly
42 It would be impossible to maintain that because one is free to accept or refuse
a given employment, or because one may at will employ or refuse to employ an-
other, it follows that the parties have a constitutional right to insert in an agree-
ment of employment any stipulation they choose. They cannot put in terms that
are against public policy either as it is deemed by the courts to exist at common
law or as it may be declared by the legislature as the arbiter within the limits of
reason of the public policy of the state ...
• ..There is a real and not a fanciful distinction between the exercise of the
right to discharge at will and the imposition of a requirement that the employ6, as
a condition of employment, shall make a particular agreement to forego a legal
right.
Id. at 35, 37 (Day, J., dissenting).
Thus, Justice Day adopted the Kansas Supreme Court's theory:
The employer may discharge an employee for the reason that the employee belongs
to a labor union, or for the reason that he belongs to a particular church or to no
church, or for any reason, or from mere whim without assigning any reason, and
the employee is equally free to quit his employment. Yet an employer has no
constitutional or inherent right to coerce or compel his employee to make any
contract or agreement, written or verbal, which he does not wish to make,
whatever may be the condition or purpose.
State v. Coppage, 87 Kan. 752, 760, 125 P. 8, 11 (1912).
The Kansas court explicitly maintained the distinction between investment and employ-
ment by upholding management control of the workplace through conditions on both the offer
and retention of employment. But the court also suggested that the public's proper concern
with the private, legal rights of the citizen employee was beyond the legitimate scope of man-
agement's private concern with production maximization.
The employer and not the employee is the master of the business to be carried on,
and it follows that he has the right to impose such terms of employment as within
reason and justice seem good to him. The employee must accept the conditions or
refuse the employment. The employer has no right by virtue of these relations to
dominate the life nor to interfere with the liberty of the employee in matters that
do not lessen or deteriorate the service.
Id. at 759, 125 P. at 11.
Here, proper public concern with protecting civil rights as one aspect of personal privacy
in competition with economic privacy is a different public extension of private interest than
Justice Pitney's private/public unity in which personal interest is subordinated to private mar-
ket exploitation. However, the Kansas court's view is also foreign to the modern public/pri-
vate distinction that centers on questions of distribution and (what amounts to the same)
regulation.
43 In Holden, for instance, the employee lacked mobility because "company" towns at
mine sites were in remote areas of Utah. See 169 U.S. at 367.
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contradicted it.44 Day embraced the at-will employment term, with
its underlying emphasis on capital mobility as normative, and corre-
spondingly approved judicial or legislative determination of economic
or other forms of coercive restriction on true capital mobility in the
name of maximized social production.45 Holmes extended the logic of
public intervention to permit changing the at-will form of contract
itself in the name of social production.46 Because Justice Pitney began
the majority opinion by admitting that noneconomic coercion is not
protected by freedom of contract, it is only the differing interpreta-
tions of a shared image of the private organization of the labor market
that distinguish the opinions' several derivations of public interest."'
44 Justices Day and Holmes offered alternative linkages of the second and third premises of
the Pitney image, which premises appear supra at text accompanying notes 23-24. Although
they both argued that mutuality of obligations does not necessarily result in efficient bargains,
Day took a paternalistic stand, asserting that the state can better judge the contract terms that
produce maximum productivity and highest labor value. 236 U.S. at 29, 30, 35-36. Holmes,
on the other hand, suggested that the transaction costs of individual bargaining prevent maxi-
mum returns to labor and justify contracting through the political process or through public
backing of private organization. Id. at 25-27. (This formulation was contributed by Robert
Rosen.)
45 "In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules and the laborers are practically
constrained to obey them. In such cases self-interest is often an unsafe guide, and
the legislature may properly interpose its authority.
• . . But the fact that the parties are of full age and competent to contract
does not necessarily deprive the State of the power to interfere where the parties do
not stand upon an equality, or where the public health demands that one party to
the contract shall be protected against himself. 'The State still retains an interest
in his welfare, however reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the sum
of all the parts, and when the individual health, safety and welfare are sacrificed or
neglected, the State must suffer.'"
236 U.S. at 41-42 (quoting Holden, 169 U.S. at 397).
46 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 27; see also Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077,
1081 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting), stating:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the
effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society,
disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible return.
Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is
the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair
and equal way.
47 Similar assumptions about the labor market's organization structure debate about Adair
and Coppage in the secondary legal literature. The debate over Adair between Richard Olney
and Charles Darling assumes that the question of police-power limits relates to the preserva-
tion of a labor market organization legally enforced in the at-will form. Olney argues that the
commerce clause power is adequate to regulate combinations of capital (employer organiza-
tions) and labor (unions) to lessen the likelihood of strikes. Olney, Discrimination Against
Union Labor-Legal?, 42 Am. L. Rev. 161, 165 (1908). Darling supports the Adair decision
so long as unions are not prohibited from bargaining for a closed shop, i.e., from conditioning
the provision of labor in a way parallel to the conditioning of the job offer. See Darling, The
Adair Case, 42 Am. L. Rev. 884 (1908). Darling reasons that so long as the economic power is
parallel, countervailing strike-avoiding incentives are preserved, but that the Olney position
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Coppage is expressly rejected as an image of civil society in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish's48 1937 overruling of fourteenth amend-
ment freedom of contract doctrine:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal posi-
tion with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively de-
fenceless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental
to their health and well being but casts a direct burden for their
support upon the community. . . .The community is not bound
to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable
employers.49
It would be curious to discover that while Coppage's natural-work-
relation image is consistently rejected as a sound basis for relating
contemporary civil and public power-in the passage of regulatory
programs like the National Labor Relations Act 50 as well as in consti-
invites a radical rethinking of the conceptual images legally assumed to organize the labor
market.
As soon as you begin to qualify the [employer's] right [to employ whom he will], to
limit the manner of its exercise, to introduce the element of motive and make that
material, you have crossed the dividing line that separates us from a state of soci-
ety where the right of private property is not recognized and protected .... The
implication of that argument is that the rightfulness of a servant's discharge-the
discharge of a servant-at-will--depends, or may be made to depend, upon the
master's motive. If that view should prevail it would indeed involve a revolution
in legal conceptions.
Id. at 886-87.
Both Olney and Darling critique case decisions in order to maintain countervailing labor
and capital power. However, Darling maintains a strong notion of mutuality as the touchstone
of contract interpretation, and he regards his maintenance of that notion as dispositive of their
debate.
Student notes on Coppage in the Harvard Law Review and Yale Law Journal disagree on
the decision's merit but not on the centrality of the labor market assumptions which control it.
Compare Note, Freedom of Contract Under the Constitution, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 496, 497-98
(1915) ("This presupposes a major premise, which is deduced from the nature of things, that
no statute which makes the 'levelling of inequalities of fortune' an end in itself can reasonably
tend to promote the public welfare.") with Comment, Legislative Power to Prohibit Certain
Restrictive Conditions in the Employment of Labor, 24 Yale L.J. 677, 681 (1915) ("But if this
construction was imperatively demanded in order to effectuate the purpose of the amendment,
what shall be said concerning that type of legislation which is enacted, not in capricious disre-
gard, but in deliberate repudiation, of the rights of liberty and property, by proceeding on the
assumption that these rights, with the inevitably consequent financial inequality, are them-
selves adverse to the public welfare? This is nothing less than an undertaking to pass judgment
on the policy of the constitution itself, which, if admitted at all, could stop at nothing short of
the annihilation of the constitutional limitations .
48 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
49 Id. at 399.
50 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935). Professor James Atleson convincingly demonstrates that the
principle of labor and capital mobility and its accompanying insulation of management invest-
ment decisions ideologically limits the NLRA's structural reach as well. Thus, even the quin-
tessential public reform of civil society, the Wagner Act, falls under the influence of the
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tutional law-the image nonetheless continues to structure the rea-
soning of labor cases involving unorganized workers. Perhaps the
surface logics of the public/private distinction underlying modem
constitutional law and the private/public unity of work relations law
indicate not so much an incoherence between the fields as a deeper
coherence and linkage assumed, but not expressed.
To illustrate this coherence in the following sections, I will limit
comparison mainly to examples from two seemingly divorced doc-
trines representing both sides of the public/private distinction. One
side is represented by a common law of private relationships, public
policy limitations upon at-will discharge of workers under indefinite
term contracts;5 the other by a keystone of New Deal public pro-
grams of redistribution, eligibility criteria for unemployment compen-
sation.5 2 Clearly, isolated examples from varying jurisdictions will
differ and the limited sample colors the argument's credibility but,
whether in divergence from each other or in divergence from the un-
derlying Coppage image of work relations, their real significance is the
remarkable persistence of the Coppage image against which all devia-
tions are played out and delimited."
a
II. THE YELLOW DOG'S BITE: CONTINUED VITALITY IN THE
"PRIVATE" WORK LAW OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
DISCHARGE
In at-will contracts, an employee may be discharged or may quit
Coppage image. See J. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (1983); see
also, Lesnick, supra note 2 (book review of Atleson's Values and Assumptions in American
Labor Law). The cases bear Atleson out. Consider, for example:
Rotation in personnel is a common thing. The employer does not enter the
fray with the burden of explanation. With discharge of employees a normal, law-
ful legitimate exercise of the prerogative of free management in a free society, the
fact of discharge creates no presumption, nor does it furnish the inference that an
illegal-not a proper-motive was its cause.
NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956).
51 Of the many recent articles on at-will discharge, the best analyses remain Blades, Em-
ployment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404 (1967); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dis-
missal: Time For A Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev. 481 (1976); Note, Protecting Employees At Will
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1931 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Protecting Employees]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Se-
curity, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335 (1974).
52 For analysis of the statutory structure of unemployment insurance and the doctrinal
issues defining eligibility, see Long Lines and Hard Times: Future Unemployment Insurance
Alternatives, 59 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 481 (1982); A Symposium on Unemployment Insurance, 8
Vand. L. Rev. 179 (1955); 55 Yale L.J. 1 (1945) (symposium issue).
53 Professor Lesnick first pointed out the centrality of Coppage ideology in work law. Les-
nick, supra note 2, at 845-46.
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for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. Doctrinal modifica-
tions limiting pure discretion have been developed on several bases:
equitable estoppel,5 4 implied covenants of good faith and fair deal-
ing,55 implied contract terms, 56 public policy limitations on motives
for contractually enforceable discharge, 7 tortious discharge based on
public policy,58 and abusive discharge. 9
These modifications' effect is constrained to reflect the Coppage
image. The last, abusive discharge, is simply an independent tort ef-
fectuated by discharge. The first, equitable estoppel, is highly disfa-
vored.' The second, implied convenants, is less but still disfavored,
except as incorporated into public policy in breach of contract ac-
tions, on the ground that, except in extremely unusual circumstances,
the four corners of the contract govern the exchange of values and
thus exhaust the equitable interests of the parties (mutuality premise).
The third, implied terms, is disfavored on the same ground, but re-
tains some independent force, especially when the terms are bargained
for and incorporated into an employee handbook (mutuality).6' How-
ever, this handbook phenomenon may only temporarily limit em-
ployer choice to the extent employers learn to sanitize their
handbooks of discharge procedures or implications of good faith, or
expressly make them gratuitous. Only the fourth, public policy ex-
ceptions to the right of at-will discharge, seems to change the natural
employment relation. Yet these exceptions explicitly rely on the pub-
lic/private distinction for definition. The change is illusory if the de-
fining image for the public policy exception remains the private/
public unity of Coppage.
Coppage assumes that economic power cannot be the direct sub-
ject of public legislation, but that noncontractual economic or physi-
cal coercion can be because it artificially interferes with mobility of
the respective capital of employer and employee to its highest present
54 See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
55 See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., I I 1 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980).
56 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
57 See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Brockmeyer
v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
58 See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980).
59 See, e.g., M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); Rice v. United
Ins. Co., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2516 (Ala. 1984).
60 Cf. Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967) (finding
estoppel doctrine inapplicable because employer provided some employment, thereby discharg-
ing its obligations to provide employment).




value. Because such mobilization is presumed to produce the highest
good-the greatest consumption power for each individual-the pub-
lic interest is defined to encompass such prohibition. Public policy
exceptions to at-will discharge similarly involve judgments that cer-
tain motives for discharge cannot be reconciled to a legitimate private
interest in capital mobility. Defining the line of impropriety in the
newer doctrine usually depends upon a distinction similar to the ear-
lier coercion/economic leverage distinction. Importantly, the natural
image of the employment relation which organizes the legal argument
remains constant regardless of whether the jurisdiction accepts or re-
jects a public policy exception.
For example, Florida has staunchly refused to adopt a public
policy limiting the employer's right to at-will discharge: it holds to the
vision of a division of labor organized by contracts of mutual obliga-
tions that necessarily tolerates inequality of bargaining power as a
consequence of capital mobility. In a recent case, Muller v. Stromberg
Carlson Corp.,62 a Florida court stated:
It may well be-and probably is-that the "balance of power"
frequently rests with the employer . . . . But mere unequal rela-
tive bargaining power of the parties in business relationships has
never been a basis on which to either create or terminate
contracts ....
• . . Florida law does not reflect those views which appear to
be based upon a perception of social or economic policy thought to
be beneficial. We would have serious reservations as to the advisa-
bility of relaxing the requirements of definiteness in employment
contracts considering the concomitant uncertainty which would re-
sult in employer-employee relationships. A basic function of the
law is to foster certainty in business relationships, not to create
uncertainty by establishing ambivalent criteria for the construction
of those relationships.63
By certainty, Florida means the right to terminate the capital re-
sources committed to labor at any time for good reason, bad reason,
or no reason at all.
In Texas the connection between at-will employment and capital
mobility is explicit in Watson v. Zep Manufacturing Co. ,' where the
court rejected an implied promise of a steady job as a bar to a day
laborer's at-will termination:
62 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
63 Id. at 269-70.
64 582 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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[Plaintiff's] principal contention is that job security is so im-
portant to workers individually and to economic and social welfare
generally that the law should impose a duty on employers to deal
fairly with workers in terminating their employment, and, there-
fore, not to discharge them without cause. [Defendant] replies that
the policy considerations run the other way. It argues that the
privilege to discharge employees at will is an important aspect of
management that cannot be denied without sacrificing efficiency of
operations and loss of confidence in worker loyalty. It insists that
if employers must be prepared to prove to a jury a "just cause" for
every discharge, they will be deterred from pruning their organiza-
tios of marginal workers whose attitude is uncooperative and
whose productivity is low.
65
The vast majority of decisions adopting public policy exceptions,
consistent with the need to promote capital mobility, turn on percep-
tions that certain motives for discharge undermine the social order
necessary to that mobility by connecting employer motive to em-
ployee status.
These decisions first slightly expand the Coppage definition of
"true" coercion to include illegal treatment of the employee's person:
sexual harrassment,66 enlistment in a conspiracy to commit criminal
acts or evade regulatory enforcement, 67 requirement that the em-
ployee forego public insurance benefits such as workmen's compensa-
tion,68 or interference with a citizen's obligations such as jury duty.
69
Arguably, prohibition of such employer motives is the necessary quid
pro quo for the legal system's enforcement and facilitation of free con-
tract and capital mobility, its provision of a stable social order that
encourages orderly investment.
Second, the employees who gain protection from at-will dis-
charges are overwhelmingly long term, managerial or skilled, and ex-
emplary performers for the company.70 In terms of the efficient use of
labor available to the society, a day laborer like the plaintiff in Watson
rarely works at one job long enough to trade longevity of performance
for a right to question management's prerogative to end his or her job
security and force job mobility. The discharge of a dock loader who
files suit to recover for the loss of his five year old's eye raises no
credibility issue when the discharge occurred in an economic cut-
65 Id. at 180.
66 Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
67 Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980).
68 Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
69 Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512, (1975) (en banc).
70 See Note, Protecting Employees, supra note 51, at 1937-47.
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back-such jobs are always at risk."
Paradoxically, if an individual is employed for short periods of
time, expects to be discharged for reasons of employer convenience,
and is largely fungible with others, the courts find little reason to in-
vestigate the motives behind the discharge because discharge is a nor-
mal situation in that segment of the labor market. Yet in a primary
job market, where an employer has invested considerable resources in
training a skilled or managerial employee and the employee's knowl-
edge correlates with longevity in the position, the courts assume that
discharge is the result of a history of conflict within the employment
entity and that the employer's sacrifice of this mutual interdepen-
dence demands an explanation. 72 Although the cause of action nomi-
nally remains a personal injury to the employee, in the latter cases it
serves as a proxy for society's interest in preventing an irrational orrogue employer from interfering with true market allocation of labor
to its most efficient use in maximizing social production for all em-
ployers and employees. This image of the employment relation subor-
dinates a derivative public order even as the public policy generated
on its logic limits the employment contract. This means the public
policy exception will prove, at worst, to be little more than an impetus
to formal record-keeping and discharge procedures, and, at best, a
very marginal restraint on the mobility of capital.
Faced with such concerns, cases that seem initially to assume an
independent public sphere yield to subsequent cases that retreat back
into the natural image of the primacy of the private. An early
landmark in public policy exceptions to at-will discharge, Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co.,7 3 was brought as a breach of contract claim.
Monge assumes the public/private distinction of modern constitu-
tional law as well as the derivative assumptions about private contrac-
tual relations in a regulated society, which were already longstanding
71 See DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
afi'd per curiam, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980).72 See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980) (retail sales representative, 15 years); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.
App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (vice-president and member of board, 32 years); Clearyv. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (airport operations
agent, 18 years); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 111. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876(1981) (manager, 16 years); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292N.W.2d 880 (1980) (manager, 5 years); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417A.2d 505 (1980) (director of medical research, 4 years); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (director of promotion services, 8years); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (salesperson, 14years); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (district
manager, 11 years).
73 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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in landlord/tenant contracts of indefinite duration and contracts for
commercial goods:
In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term,
the employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be
balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his
employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper bal-
ance between the two. . . . We hold that a termination by the
employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated
by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best
interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes
a breach of the employment contract.74
Still, this three-corner scheme of employer, employee, and public in
Monge is not a departure from the perceived natural state of social
relations. The court explained that "[s]uch a rule affords the em-
ployee a certain stability of employment and does not interfere with
the employer's normal exercise of his right to discharge, which is nec-
essary to permit him to operate his business efficiently and
profitably.""
Yet in subsequent New Hampshire cases applying the Monge
rule the image shifts. The public interest in the employee's personal
interest in job security ceases to have any importance apart from its
contribution to an independently generalized statutory interest of the
general community." By 1983, less than ten years after Monge, a
federal district court77 noted in a diversity case that "although dis-
charge may be harsh, unfair, or without good cause, unless there is a
sufficient showing to support a factual finding that the management
decision in question is contrary to a public policy, a discharge for
business reasons is not actionable."78 Bad faith alone is no longer
against public policy because, recalling Monge, it is against the eco-
nomic system's interest. A contract action depends upon a distinct
74 Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551 (citation omitted).
75 Id., 316 A.2d at 551-52.
76 Six years after the Monge decision the New Hampshire Supreme Court limited that
case's holding, stating:
We [narrowly] construe Monge to apply only to a situation where an employee is
discharged because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or
refused to do that which public policy would condemn .... A discharge due to
sickness does not fall within this category, and is generally remedied by medical
insurance or disability provisions in an employment contract. Nor does discharge
because of age fall within this narrow category. The proper remedy for an action
for unlawful age discrimination is provided for by statute.
Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980) (citations
omitted).
77 Vandegrift v. American Brands Corp., 572 F. Supp. 496 (D.N.H. 1983).
78 Id. at 499.
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public policy decision either that some relational actions are not per-
mitted to be economic choices or that a contractor's actions interfere
with the mobility of resources encouraged by contract relations or-
ganizing economic activity. Similarly, protecting capital mobility
comports with good faith. The same federal court explained: "Of
course, there exists in every contractual relationship an implied cove-
nant that the parties will carry out their obligations in good
faith. . . The implied covenant, however, is dependent upon the
contractual relationship of the parties, and does not itself create an
independent tort duty."79 Further, tort duties in the relationship have
a similar character to contract obligations and "[t]he claim that de-
fendant owed to plaintiffs a duty of fairness is not that sort of positive
legal duty, independent of the contract, upon which public policy
rests."' 0
California, with the most extensive case law and farthest reach-
ing recognition of the public policy exception, creates a hybrid action
for wrongful discharge mindful of the tort-like source of the legal
duty. The leading case is Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,"1 in which
the discharge was allegedly due to the employee's refusal to partici-
pate in a price-fixing scheme:
[W]e conclude that an employee's action for wrongful discharge is
ex delicto and subjects an employer to tort liability. . . . [A]n em-
ployer's obligation to refrain from discharging an employee who
refuses to commit a criminal act does not depend upon any express
or implied "promises set forth in the [employment] contract,"...
but rather reflects a duty imposed by law upon all employers in
order to implement the fundamental public policies embodied in
the state's penal statutes.8 2
Resting limitations to discharge upon a social policy-based duty in-
dependent of the contract promotes public duty over private obliga-
tions only to the extent that the social policy has not been derived
from and limited by the Coppage image of employment relations in
civil society. The aggregate social resource maximization that would
suffer from price fixing is dependent upon economic leverage that is
unconnected to contract behavior designed to elicit labor in the open
market.
79 Id. (citation omitted).
80 Id.
81 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
82 Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (quoting Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d
807, 811, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (1952), which quoted Peterson v. Sherman, 68 Cal. App. 2d 706,
711, 157 P.2d 863, 866 (1945)).
19851
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:765
III. THE YELLOW DOG'S TAIL: THE EMPLOYMENT IMAGE IN
THE "PUBLIC" LAW OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
The image of the employment relation based on mobility of both
employers' and employees' capital, given its accompanying consump-
tion-oriented division of labor, should rarely tolerate a public interest
in job market stability. This should be particularly true where the
public insures some degree of labor force availability, despite the dis-
ruptions in employees' lives created by employers' capital mobility, by
imposing a risk-pooling insurance term in most employment con-
tracts. Consequently, the Coppage private/public unity's resilience
would be importantly confirmed if arguments and effects similar to
those in the public policy exception to discharge doctrine are discov-
ered in the legal structure of unemployment compensation. Analysis
using the Coppage image reveals why only some workers' purchasing
power is publicly insured through enforced employer-employee risk
pooling.
According to unemployment compensation doctrine, a worker's
insurability against unemployment turns on key assumptions that de-
fine the distinction between involuntary and voluntary detachment
from the labor force.8 3  Involuntary detachment is unemployment
83 The underlying requirement for unemployment compensation eligibility is that the
claimant be available to work. The threshold question for initial eligibility is: Did the claim-
ant involuntarily leave his or her past employment! If a worker was discharged for cause, she
is held to have forfeited or waived her connection to that specific job and thus to have volun-
tarily left employment. Similarly, a voluntary quit without good cause, which in almost all
jurisdictions also necessarily must be good cause attributable to the employer, is a voluntary
ending of employment. Good cause, in this context, is more than a good personal reason for
refusal of work. The reason must indicate continued involuntariness in the unemployment.
See, e.g., Tannariello v. Federation of Pub. Employees, 437 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (reasonable fear for safety may be good cause); Gibson v. Rutledge, 298 S.E.2d 137 (W.
Va. 1982) (termination for health reasons found involuntary). Voluntary termination estab-
lishes ineligibility for compensation at the outset.
The criteria for continued eligibility exhibit the same underlying concern. The compen-
sated individual must demonstrate her continued and current attachment to the labor force,
her readiness and willingness to accept suitable work. The availability-for-work requirement
demands that the claimant do more than simply register in an employment agency. The claim-
ant must actively seek work, demonstrating a mental attitude which indicates actual availabil-
ity. An additional component of the availability requirement is that the claimant not refuse
suitable work offers without good cause. A question arises whether good cause to refuse suita-
ble work in a continuing eligibility situation is the same as good cause to quit in establishing
initial eligibility. Variables weighed in determining whether good cause exists for refusing
suitable work include distance, Brenner v. Commissioner, Unemployment Compensation Bd.
of Review, 75 Pa. Commw. 428, 461 A.2d (1983); health risks, Alexander v. California Unem-
ployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 104 Cal. App. 3d 97, 163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980); past experience,
Perfin v. Cole, 327 S.E.2d 396 (W. Va. 1985); training and earnings in the available compara-
ble job, In re Fickbohm, 323 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1982); likelihood of other work, In re Behnke,
97 A.D.2d 679, 469 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1983); and duration of unemployment, ElIwood City Hosp.
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through the employer's unilateral action ("discharge without cause")
or through the employee's quitting or refusing employment for pub-
licly approved reasons. Voluntary detachment is unemployment
stemming from the employee's action ("discharge for cause") or her
purely personal reasons for absence. The public will not insure work-
ers against the consequences of unemployment unless those conse-
quences impact the public interest, chiefly the preservation and
availability of skills in the marketplace. If the employer is not re-
quired to acknowledge the employee's personal reasons for absence or
the employee's interest in the job (because no property right inheres in
a job while at-will employment is the rule), there is no public interest
in insuring the consequences to an employee who voluntarily leaves
her employment. Thus the same private/public unity underlying the
division-of-labor assumptions of at-will discharges underlie the defini-
tion of insurability for unemployment compensation.84 The leading
case of Dubkowski v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation
v. Commissioner, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 73 Pa. Commw. 78, 457 A.2d
231 (1983).
84 In California and Massachusetts involuntary detachment is unemployment for any good
reason over which the individual is not in control-whether caused by the employer, or a job
offer, or the employee's personal circumstances (e.g., transportation inadequacies)--or any
good reason which the individual should not be expected to be subjected to the market place
(e.g., domestic obligations). See Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 20 Cal. 3d 55,
569 P.2d 740, 141 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1977); Raytheon Co. v. Director Div. of Employment Sec.,
364 Mass. 593, 307 N.E.2d 330 (1974). Such reasons do not, however, allow a sharp public/
private dichotomy. Just as in these same jurisdictions a sharp public/private dichotomy was
not available to define the public policy exception to at-will discharges, it is not available to
determine what constitutes involuntary detachment. Compare cases on at-will discharge:
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)
(wrongful discharge suit sounds in tort because of employer's ex delicto duty to refrain from
coercing employee's participation in criminal activity arises from policy underlying state stat-
utes, but issue whether such suit sounds in contract left open); Cleary v. American Airlines,
Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (employer's discharge of employee
without legal cause may violate implied covenant of good faith, thus wrongful discharge suit
may sound in contract as well as tort because of public interest in job security serving an
interest in social stability); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251 (1977) (employer breached contract by failing to exercise good faith in discharging em-
ployee to avoid paying full commission, in spite of apparent authority to withhold payment
under the contract, but court declined to decide whether tort remedy was available for wrong-
ful discharge); with cases on involuntary detachment: Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd., 20 Cal. 3d at 69-72, 569 P.2d at 749-51, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 155-57 (1977) (because state
statutes impose on parents' responsibility to their children, unemployment insurance system
must balance parental duties against burdens of work in determining "good cause" qualifica-
tion to availability for work); Raytheon Co. v. Director Div. of Employment Sec., 364 Mass.
593, 307 N.E.2d 330 (1979) (since employee left employment involuntarily, albeit for personal
reasons, and had no means of transportation to job, she was immediately eligible for unem-
ployment compensation). Most jurisdictions, however, treat such reasons for refusal of work
as good personal reasons but nonetheless voluntary reasons or incapacities. See infra note 88
on the leading case, Aladdin Indus. v. Scott, 219 Tenn. 71, 407 S.W.2d 161 (1966).
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Act"3 makes this explicit:
The development and preservation of worker skills and the ad-
vancement and utilization of employee training are of general pub-
lic concern. The unemployment compensation law is designed to
protect rather than depress the present social status and standard
of living of a claimant.
"... Employment which may not be suitable while there is
still a good present expectancy of obtaining other employment
more nearly proportionate to the ability of the worker may become
suitable if that expectancy is not realized within a reasonable time.
Employment which may be unsuitable in a period of full employ-
ment may be suitable in a period of depression or of falling wages."
. .. "To force a worker to accept a job at less than his highest
skill at the peril of losing his unemployment compensation might
result in the loss of this skill and is economic waste which should
be avoided as long as there is a reasonable probability of its not
being necessary." . . . "It seems reasonable, therefore, that work
at a lesser skill and lower wages should not be deemed suitable
unless a claimant has been given a reasonable period in which to
compete in the labor market for available jobs at his highest skill or
related skills * * *.,6
Even a direct public intervention in the contractual organization
of the labor market fosters rather than corrupts the private nature of
the consumption society. Unemployment insurance represents a pub-
licly imposed risk-pooling term of the wage contract that reinforces
at-will employment contracting and thus employers' and employees'
capital mobility. Employ.e'rs need not tie themselves to durational
contracts to ensure the preservation and availability of skills, and em-
ployees are insured to some extent in job searches that will result in
their skills' use. However, insurable mobility cannot include employ-
ees' personal restrictions on job continuance or acceptablity without
trenching upon management's prerogative to control investment by
defining and offering positions in the labor market.87 A reserve labor
85 150 Conn. 278, 188 A.2d 658 (1963).
86 Id. at 282-83, 188 A.2d at 660-61 (quoting respectively Pacific Mills v. Director of Div.
of Employment Sec., 322 Mass. 345, 350, 77 N.E.2d 413, 416 (1948); Freeman, Able to Work
and Available for Work, 55 Yale L.J. 123, 127 (1945); Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55
Yale L.J. 134, 142 (1945)).
87 The distinction between personal, and thus voluntary, absence from the labor market
and publicly sanctioned, insurable reasons for absence makes refusal of suitable work because
of child care responsiblities voluntary absence. Only in California are domestic obligations
recognized as good cause for refusal of suitable work. Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd., 20 Cal. 3d 55, 569 P.2d 740, 141 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1977). More typical is Tennessee, where
a woman who refused a transfer to a night shift for child care reasons was held to have volun-
tarily left her employment:
To uphold the decision of the Board of Review would be placing in the hands of
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pool tailored to include only readily available workers aids workers'
capital, labor, to move to its highest market-valued use at the same
time that consumption demand is stabilized.88 The reserve pool there-
fore falls into the category of a public resource inadequately provided
or provided at high cost by the market.
IV. OLD TRICKS
A division of labor that is conceptually structured to maximize
consumption extends logically to the limitation of the costs of produc-
tion, including returns to employees for their labor.8 9 Structurally
the employee the right to determine when and Under what conditions she would
work. Such a holding would unduly restrict the employer and could conceivably,
under certain circumstances, make it almost impossible to carry on a business dur-
ing certain hours.
Aladdin Indus. v. Scott, 219 Tenn. 71, 78, 407 S.W.2d 161, 164 (1966).
88 Chief Justice Burger, in California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S.
121 (1971), describes the program in terms Justice Pitney would recognize and Justice Day
could embrace:
It is true, as appellants argue, that the unemployment compensation insur-
ance program was not based on need in the sense underlying the various welfare
programs that had their genesis in the same period of economic stress a generation
ago. A kind of "need" is present in the statutory scheme for insurance, however,
to the extent that any "salary replacement" insurance fulfills a need caused by lost
employment ...
.. . Further, providing for "security during the period following unemploy-
ment" was thought to be a means of assisting a worker to find substantially
equivalent employment. The Federal Relief Administrator testified that the Act
"covers a great many thousands of people who are thrown out of work suddenly.
It is essential that they be permitted to look for a job. They should not be doing
anything else but looking for a job." Finally, Congress viewed unemployment in-
surance payments as a means of exerting an influence upon the stabilization of
industry. "Their only distinguishing feature is that they will be specially
earmarked for the use of the unemployed at the very times when it is best for
business that they should be so used." Early payment of insurance benefits serves
to prevent a decline in the purchasing power of the unemployed, which in turn
serves to aid industries producing goods and services.
Id. at 130-32 (quoting respectively S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935); Hearings
on H.R. 4120 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (1935)
(statement of Federal Relief Administrator and Member of the Committee on Economic Se-
curity); Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1311
(1935) (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner)).
89 See supra note 33. It may be argued that while this articulation may have been un-
problematic at the time of Coppage, the New Deal radically altered a legal consciousness com-
mitted to labor-cost minimization. In fact, unemployment insurance, insofar as it is
rationalized as maintaining aggregate demand, seems to directly support such a view. But
stabilized demand is merely an incidental effect if eligibility criteria are formulated: (1) to
insulate from legal responsibility investment decisions concerning employees' deployment, so
that neither employer nor state need take account of an employee's personal interests in condi-
tioning her availability for employment; or (2) to insulate those decisions from any need to
calculate risks in return on the employer's capital due to instability in the supply of skills. An
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and logically, employers, as society's agents, need control over invest-
ment decisions and the maximum potential mobility for their capital.
Such mobility would be sacrificed if public regulation of employment
relations either directly or implicitly broke down the separation be-
tween organizational production decisions and inducement of workers
to provide their capital, labor, to production processes. Instead, legal
mechanisms maintain and enforce the separation of invested re-
sources' allocation and exchange relations eliciting labor time.'
It must be borne in mind, however, that the circumstance that a
contract for labor time gives labor the legal form of a commodity,
rather than an investment,9' does not of itself support an argument
that labor must or should be so treated. Rather, it is a demonstration
of how the phenomenology of law imagines labor in the simultaneous
mirroring and constructing of reality.92 The argument is not that ide-
ologies are constructed like dreams and then sold to a gullible public
as rules of law. For an image to be accepted as natural, and thus as a
structure for purposive and persuasive conceptual argument, it must
correlate to the actual social relations it manifests. The image may be
central, as in Coppage, when the ideology it prefigures in its descrip-
tions of natural social relations can be deployed in programs that are
politically palatable. It may be peripheral, merely the logical exten-
sion of legal forms of contract and property entitlements, when the
politics of legal phenomena seem constructed and conflicted, as in
public policy exceptions to discharge. It may appear solely as an un-
conscious limit on the conceivable uses of public power, as in the
skilled labor pool insured by an unemployment program of limited
eligibility.
insured skilled-labor supply makes the at-will contract more tolerable, minimizes the individ-
ual employer's labor costs, increases employers' ability to react to market changes by adjusting
their utilization of labor, and supports employees' capital (labor) mobility as a public good
rather than as a redistribution of marginal consumption propensities. See Kennedy, Cost-
Reduction Theory As Legitimation, 90 Yale L.J. 1275, 1277-81 (1981).
90 K. Marx, I Capital 81-96 (1919).
91 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), in which Jus-
tice Powell wrote:
Only in the most abstract sense may it be said that an employee "exchanges" some
portion of his labor in return for these possible benefits. He surrenders his labor as
a whole, and in return receives a compensation package that is substantially devoid
of aspects resembling a security. His decision to accept and retain covered em-
ployment may have only an attenuated relationship, if any, to perceived invest-
ment possibilities of a future pension. Looking at the economic realities, it seems
clear that an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not
making an investment.
Id. at 560 (footnote omitted).
92 Gabel, supra note 24, at 1564-72.
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The public/private distinction can mask the direction of political
processes-for example in cases limiting police power, enforceable in-
terests, or public provision for the needs of labor market exchanges-
but it cannot unhinge the relationship between social structure and
the reproduction of society, both of which include conceptual
understanding.
I do not assert that ideas cause the form of social relations or the
reverse. Rather, the constructed nature of both claims of knowledge
and of conceptions of the social world and the representations of ma-
terial conditions in ideas result from the struggle of individuals and
groups. Legal discourse is one arena of such struggle. Justice Pitney
could have constructed a policy argument perfectable to the facts of
Coppage based on the four premises that embody the employment re-
lation.93 Notably, he did not, and all evidence suggests a directly
political argument never crossed his mind. The stronger assertion is
that had such an argument occurred to him, its occurrence would
have been due to its appropriateness to the phenomenology of the la-
bor market which constituted his understanding:
The abstract concept of the world is a necessary condition if com-
municatively acting subjects are to reach understanding among
themselves about what takes place in the world or is to be effected
in it. Through this communicative practice they assure themselves
at the same time of their common life-relations, of an intersubjec-
tively shared lifeworld. This lifeworld is bounded by the totality of
interpretations presupposed by the members as background
knowledge.
9 4
It may be that continued structuring of legal consciousness ac-
cording to an artificial image of the labor market, and the impover-
ished polity which it suggests, is not necessary and is vulnerable. But
the choice made long ago has continued, masked by a double false
consciousness of a discarded private/public unity in constitutional
law that is held onto in contract forms, and in the nonexistent and
therefore empty images of the contemporary public/private distinc-
tion of a statism known only by reference to civil society.
Two moves have been made. First, the social consequences of a
labor market supported by the private/public unity of Coppage's legal
consciousness were deflected into the state's arena by the creation of
public policy exceptions to discharge and public insurance programs.
Second, the state, as a form for organizing society's division of labor,
93 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
94 1 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization
of Society 13 (1984).
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was kept purely formal and derivative to simultaneously hide the con-
tinued generation of social consequences of exchange relations, and
yet still allow mediation of those consequences as conflict and aliena-
tion in a manner which permitted the stable reproduction of those
social relations. Under these circumstances, attributing a causal di-
rection to the order of ideas in relation to events represents an unclear
meaning and intent. The goal is to uncover that which is taken as
natural and which need not be caused, but which limits our
possibilities.
The public, political power's primacy in creating contingent bar-
gainable entitlements is false and apparent so long as the conceptual-
ized phenomenon of the public domain remains a universalized
abstraction of a particular, historical, and concrete image of civil soci-
ety. Paradoxically, the celebration of legal contingency in private re-
lations, which are subject to public control in the name of general
welfare, misses the point. Such contingency is manufactured by vir-
tue of the primary assumption of naturalness in which the exercise of
public power is always about the coherence of departure from what is
already known, already fact, already constructed.
Katherine Stone has argued that the ideology of collective bar-
gaining as private government similarly freezes inequalities of prop-
erty entitlements and bargaining power into the interpretation of
thereby weakened public intervention in labor relations under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.95
James Atleson96 and Karl Klare97 have linked the public/private
distinction and mobility of capital to judicial retrenchment of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Karl Klare particularly sees the re-
trenchment as the result of an incoherent manipulation of the modern
public/private distinction. However, these issues are far more intrac-
table than these commentators suggest because they are linked to
much of the deep structure of American law.98 This historically older
structure gains its most explicit form in the forgotten case law of un-
95 Stone, The Post-war Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 Yale L.J. 1509 (1981).
96 Atleson, supra note 50.
97 Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 310-18 (1978); Klare, supra note 5.
98 In principle, and in fact, issues of equal pay and comparable worth, speech and protest
in the workplace, tort and safety obligations, permanent employment contracts, and much of
collective-bargaining law serve as easily as at-will discharge and unemployment compensation
law to manifest the conceptual structure of work law. Tracing the structure of legal conscious-
ness of work is the subject of my work in progress, to which this Article is an introduction.
The immediate project concerns the false consciousness constituted in employment compensa-
tion law and the shared relationship of employment and unemployment to the conceptualiza-
tion of the labor market and the role of the state.
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organized workers-by far the most numerous group in our society.
Labor law as an arena for the imagining of the possible organization
of social production need not, indeed cannot, learn new tricks until it
has forgotten the old ones.
